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Abstract 
This paper revisits the notion of dynamic threshold identity-based encryption, due to the recent practical 
interest. In this notion, an encryptor selects n recipients and a threshold value t for the creation of the 
ciphertext. The plaintext can only be recovered if at least t receivers cooperate. The key issue in this 
notion is its dynamicity, where after the users enroll to the system, the sender can dynamically select the 
set of recipients as well as dynamically set the threshold t upon the creation of the ciphertext. Another 
essential feature of this notion is the need for a constant-size ciphertext. Interestingly, the work by 
Delerablée and Pointcheval in Crypto 2008 is the only work that achieves this essential feature. In this 
work, we propose a new scheme achieving all of these nice properties with significant improvements in 
terms of the computational efficiency (both the encryption and decryption). In our scheme, there is no 
need to conduct any encryption and decryption using additional dummy users, which are not part of the 
recipient group, which is in contrast to Delerablée and Pointcheval's work. This improvement has 
significantly reduced the amount of computations required in both encryption and decryption algorithms. 
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Efficient Threshold Attribute-Based Encryption
with Constant-size Ciphertexts without Dummy
Attributes
Abstract. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is an augmentation of
public key encryption that allows users to encrypt and decrypt messages
based on user attributes. In a threshold ABE, users who can decrypt
the ciphertexts must hold at least t attributes among a certain universe
of attributes, selected by the encryptor. At PKC 2010, Herranz, Laguil-
laumie and Ràfols presented the first threhold ABE with constant size
ciphertexts. To make sure the encryptor can flexibly select the attribute
set and a threshold value, they employed dummy attributes to satisfy
the decryption requirement. The nice feature of this scheme is that any
addition or removal of the attributes will not require any changes to
any of the user’s private keys. Unfortunately, the need for the dummy
attributes has made the scheme become inefficient, since the encryp-
tion efficiency is linear to the size of selected attribute set and dummy
attribute set. In this work, we propose a novel approach to achieve a
constant-size threshold ABE without dummy attributes. Our scheme re-
tains the nice feature offered earlier. Furthermore, the scheme has offered
two improvements in comparison to the previous work. First, in terms
of the cost for encryption and decryption is only linear to the size of the
selected attribute set. Second, without any dummy attributes, major-
ity of the computations can be conducted without the knowledge of the
threshold value. Hence, threshold change in the encryption phase does
not require complete recomputation of the ciphertext.
Keywords: threshold attribute-based encryption, constant size, dummy at-
tributes, provable security.
1 Introduction
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [12] has been a very active area of research
recently, since it supports fine-grained access control of shared data. ABE is
an extension of public key encryption that allows users to encrypt and decrypt
messages based on user attributes. It is very useful in providing anonymous
access control, which is a very desirable property in many applications, such as
encrypted storage in distributed environments. In a ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption (CP-ABE) scheme, the attributes of the users determine their
secret keys. When an encryptor encrypts a message, he/she selects a policy
indicating what kinds of subset of attributes that must be held by a receiver in
order to be able to decrypt. Unfortunately, this extra functionality comes at a
cost. In a typical implementation, the size of the ciphertext is proportional to the
number of attributes associated with it and the decryption time is proportional
to the number of attributes used during decryption.
The first CP-ABE with constant-size ciphertexts under AND gates access
structure was proposed in [5]. Subseqently, Herranz, Laguillaumie and Ràfols
[10]1 presented the first constant size ciphertexts in threshold ABE, which rep-
resents a more expressive access structure in comparison to [5]. Their construc-
tion works for the threshold case, where users who are authorized to decrypt are
those who hold at least t attributes among a certain universe of attributes, for
some threshold value t selected by the encryptor. The flexibility in this scheme
is due to the ability of the encryptor to select any threshold value t during the
encryption phase, which makes the scheme very practical. The scheme is inspired
from the technique introduced by Delerablée and Pointcheval [7] in achieiving a
dynamic threshold identity-based encryption. The scheme is proven secure under
the standard model by reduction to the augmented multi-sequence of exponents
decisional Diffie-Hellman (aMSE-DDH) problem [10].
The technique used in Delerablée and Pointcheval [7] is to incorporate some
“dummy information” (and hence, the notion of dummy users in the context
of the proposed identity-based encryption scheme in [7]) as part of the com-
putations in order to achieve constant size property. This inherent technique is
carried across to achieve the construction of threshold ABE scheme in [10] with
the introduction of dummy attributes, which leads to significant inefficiency in
both encryption and decryption algorithms, since their efficiencies are linear to
the size of selected attribute set and dummy attribute set. To illustrate this,
consider the following parameters used in [10]. Let s be the number of attributes
in the chosen attribute set S, t is the corresponding threshold number and m is
the upper bound of attribute number in S. The costs for conducting encryption
and decryption in [10] are mainly dominated by m+ t+ 1 exponentiations and
O(t2 +m) exponentiations, resp. In a typical scenario where m = 10, 000, t = 3
and s = 10. It means the encryptor allows the user to decrypt the ciphertext
if there are 3 matching attributes among the 10 attributes specified are owned
by the user. Nevertheless, the small choice of parameters in s and t will result
in a large computation requirement, since m is large. It is clear that the main
stumbling block for this inefficiency is due to the value of m, which is the number
of dummy attributes.
Herranz et al.’s scheme is equipped with a nice feature, namely any addition
or removal of the attributes will not require any changes to any of the user’s pri-
vate keys. We note that there are some subsequent works that achieve threshold
ABE but they are not equipped with this feature. These works will be reviewed
in the related work.
Summary of Our Contributions
The contributions of this paper are twofold:
1 The expanded version of this paper appeared in [1].
– We achieve an efficient threshold ABE with constant size ciphertexts without
using dummy attributes. Prior to this work, the authors in [10] makes use
of dummy attributes to satisfy the threshold decryption requirement. This
poses great inefficiency in terms of computations in encryption and decryp-
tion phases. Let s be the number of attributes in the chosen attribute set
S, t be the corresponding threshold number and m be the upper bound of
attribute number in S. The major cost for encryption for the scheme in [10]
in comparison to ours is m+ t+1 exponentiations and s+3 exponentiations,
resp. The major cost for decryption for the scheme in [10] in comparison to
ours is O(t2+m) exponentiations and O(ts+s) exponentiations, resp. In our
scheme, the pairing computation can be further saved using precomputation
in the public parameters (refer to Sec. 3 for the detail).
– We enable an efficient threshold change for the encryptor during the encryp-
tion process, in comparison to the previous work in [10]. The impact of using
dummy attributes is the threshold value t must be known in the beginning
of the encryption process, as this value determines how the ciphertext is
being formed. By using our approach, the impact of the value t may only be
required in one or two operations during the encryption, but not the over-
all computation. Therefore, the encryptor can change the threshold value t
without having to recompute the overall ciphertext.
Technical Contributions
In the following, we will describe the overview of our technique in comparison







at∈AS (γ + τ(at))
,
which has degree m+ t− 1− |AS |. Here, |AS | denotes the number of attributes
in AS .
Given the ciphertext, any private key user (AS 6= ∅) can compute
e(gα, h)−κ · e(gα, h)rκ and e(gα, h)rκγ
i
: i ∈ [1,m− 1] and e(gα, h)rκF (γ).
According to the setting, all redundant group elements e(gα, h)rκγ
i
must be re-
moved to extract the encryption key. Therefore, the user will successfully decrypt
the ciphertext iff F (γ) has m−1 degrees at most, which requires |AS | ≥ t. If they
do not embed dummy attributes in F (γ), the degree of F (γ) will be always less
than m− 1 when the user has an attribute, such that the user can decrypt the
ciphertext even his/her attribute number does not satisfy the threshold number.
We notice that the degree of F (γ) in the construction is mainly dominated
by group elements e(gα, h)rκγ
i
, which can be computed by all users. Since all
users can compute e(gα, h)rκγ
i
for all i up to m − 1, the security requires that
e(gα, h)rκF (γ) with an (m−1)-degree polynomial can only be generated by valid
users.
We take a different approach in building our scheme. We avoid the use of
dummy attributes by setting the way that all users can only compute e(gα, h)rκγ
i
for all i up to s − t − 1, instead of m − 1. Let AS ⊆ A ∩ S be the attribute set
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where F (γ) is a polynimial in γ with degree s− |As|.







: i ∈ [1−m,−1] and e(gα, h)rκF (γ).
The user will successfully decrypt the ciphertext iff F (γ) has an degree s − t.
That is, |AS | = t. If |AS | < t, we have the degree of F (γ) is larger than s − t
such that all redundancy (that is e(gα, h)rκγ
i
) cannot be removed for extracting
the encryption key e(gβ , hαγ
s−t
)−κ.
Structures of Private Key and Ciphertext
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Table 1. Comparison between the structure of Herranz et al.’s scheme [10] and our
scheme. In the private key, A is the set of attributes for a user and r is the chosen
random number in private key generation. In the encryption, S is the set of attributes
with s attributes where t is the corresponding threshold number. κ is the chosen random
number in encryption.
Using our approach, we can inherently solve the second motivation of our work,
which will be illustrated later.
1.1 Related Work
The notion of attribute-based encryption (ABE) was first put forth by Sahai and
Waters in [12], which was originally referred to as fuzzy identity-based encryp-
tion. Goyal et al. [9] further defined two variants of ABE, namely Key-Policy
ABE (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE). In a KP-ABE scheme,
the ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes. The decryption key, which
is issued by an authority, is associated with an access structure. The ciphertext
will be decryptable with the decryption key if and only if the attribute set of
ciphertext satisfies the access structure of the decryption key. In contrast, in a
CP-ABE scheme, the ciphertext is equipped with an access structure, while the
decryption key is associated with a set of attributes. Decryption condition is
defined similarly, namely the decryption is successful if and only if the attribute
set fulfills the access structure. CP-ABE is more appropriate in access control
applications, since it enables the encryptor to select the access structure to de-
cide who is authorized to acquire the message. While the notion of CP-ABE has
been proposed by Goyal et al. [9], the first concrete construction was presented
by Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters [2].
The ciphertext size in majority constructions of CP-ABE is linear in the num-
ber in the number of selected attributes. The first CP-ABE with constant-size
ciphertexts under AND gates access structure was proposed in [5]. Subsequently,
in [10], Herranz, Laguillaumie and Ràfols initiated the study on achieving con-
stant size ciphertext in threshold ABE, which is more expressive than merely
AND gates (c.f. [5]). They incorporated the technique from [7] to achieve this,
where the original work in [7] concentrates on achieving constant size ciphertext
in a dynamic threshold identity-based encryption setting. Subsequently, Ge et
al. [8] and Chen et al. [4] presented other constructions of threshold ABE scheme
with constant size ciphertext, which aims to achieve a stronger security model.
In [8, 4], the private key generation requires a fixed universal attribute set
prior to the private key generation. This means, any addition or removal of
the attributes will require changes to all of the user’s private keys. In contrast,
Herranz et al.’s scheme [10] does not have this inherent drawback. This is because
there is no requirement to map an attribute to a group element in this scheme
(cf. [8, 4]). The difference between these two approaches are usually referred
to as “small universe” vs. “large universe”. In a small universe constructions,
at the setup time, a polynomially sized universe of attributes must be fixed.
Additionally, the public parameters size is linear to the size of the attribute
universe set. On the other hand, in a large universe constructions, the size of
the attribute universe can be exponentially large. Furthermore, the size of the
public parameters is linear to the upper bound of attribute number in S, where
S is the selected attribute set in the encryption phase. For further detail about
the differences between these, we refer the reader to [11].
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we revisit the definition and security model of threshold attribute-
based encryption given in [10]. We also introduce a variant computational hard
problem which is related to the security proof of our scheme.
2.1 Threshold Attribute-Based Encryption
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption supporting the threshold decryp-
tion policies consists of the following four algorithms.
– Setup(λ,P,m) The algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ, a
universal set of attributes P and the upper bound of attribute number in
encryption. It returns public parameters params and a master secret key.
– Key Extraction(params, A,msk) The algorithm takes as input public pa-
rameters, an attribute set A ⊆ P and the master secret key. It returns a
private key skA for this attribute set.
– Encryption(params, S, t,M) The algorithm takes as input public parame-
ters, an attribute set S with a threshold number t satisfying 1 ≤ t ≤ |S| and
a message M . It returns a ciphertext CT for (S, t).
– Decryption(CT, (S, t), A, skA) The algorithm takes as input a ciphertext
for (S, t), the attribute set A and related private key skA. It returns a message
if |A ∩ S| ≥ t.
We notice that the size of P in the original definition [?] is equal to m. However,
we found the size of P can be larger than m. The independence is much practical
in use and we therefore adopt the second definition. We show that this difference
will not affect the construction and security proof in this work.
The security model of threshold ABE for indistinguishability under selective
security against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-sCPA) is defined by considering
the following game between an attacker A and a challenger.
1. The challenger specifies a universe of attributes P and upper bound number
m, which are given to the attacker A.
2. The attacker A selects a subset S ⊆ P with s attributes and a threshold
number t for challenge, where s and t satisfy 1 ≤ t ≤ s.
3. The challenger runs the setup algorithm of ABE algorithm and gives params
to the attacker.
4. [Private Key Queries] The attacker adaptively sends any subset of attributes
A ⊆ P for private key queries with the restriction |A∩S| < t. The challenger
runs the key extraction algorithm and gives the corresponding private key
skA to the attacker A.
5. [Challenge] The attacker outputs two messages M0,M1 for challenge. The
challenger randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and runs the encryption algo-
rithm on the message Mb for (S, t) specified in the second step. The corre-
sponding ciphertext CT ∗ is given to the attacker as the challenge ciphertext.
6. Step 4 is repeated.
7. The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b and wins the game if b′ = b.
The advantage of the attacker in the above game is defined as |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
A Threshold ABE is said to be IND-sCPA secure if this advantage is negligible
with respect to the security parameter λ for all polynomial attackers A.
2.2 The aMSE-DDH Problem
Our scheme is also based on a bilinear pairing but its security relies on a hard
problem slightly different from the problem defined in [10, 7]. Here, we still call
this problem as an augmented multi-sequence of exponents decisional Diffie-
Hellman problem (aMSE-DHE) since the main difference is in the given expo-
nents. In the subsequent section, we prove that this aMSE-DDH problem is one
of generic Diffie-Hellman problems defined by Boneh, Boyen and Goh in [3].
Let BG = (G,GT , p, e) be the pairing group, where p is the prime order
of both groups and e is the bilinear map. Let g0, h0 be two generators of G.
The input of aMSE-DDH problem consists of q, s, t, f(x), g(x), T ∈ GT where
































































0 , · · · , h
ωγm+t
0 .
All roots xi, x
′
i are given but all exponents α0, β0, γ, ω are unknown. The aim of
this problem is to decide whether the given group element T is
T = e(g0, h0)
κα0β0f(γ)γ
m+s−1
or T is a random element from GT .
Theorem 1. The aMSE-DDH assumption is a (P,Q, F )-Generic Diffie-Hellman
Exponent (GDHE) assumption.
Proof. The proof will be provided in Appendix A.
3 The New Threshold ABE Scheme
3.1 Description of Scheme
Setup(λ,P,m). The master entity chooses a suitable encoding τ sending each
of the attributes at ∈ P onto a different element τ(at) ∈ Zp. He also chooses a
bilinear group BG = (G,GT , p, e) and generators g, h of G1. Next, the master
entity picks at random α, β, γ ∈ Zp and sets
gi = g
α
γi , hi = h
αγi , u = gβ , i ∈ [0,m].
The master secret key is msk = (g, h, β, γ) and the public parameters are
params =
{
BG,P, m, g0, g1, g2, · · · , gm, h0, h1, h2, · · · , hm, u, τ
}
.
Key Extraction(params, A,msk). Given any subset A ⊂ P, the master entity


















Encryption(params, S, t,M). Given a subset S ⊂ P with s = |S| attributes, a
threshold t satisfying 1 ≤ t ≤ s, and a message M ∈ GT , the sender picks at









K = e(hs−t, u)
κ.
The group element C2 is computed from h
αγi given in the public parameters
params. Let fS(x) =
∏
at∈S(x+τ(at)) be the polynomial in x and ai be the coef-
ficient of xi. We have C2 =
∏s
i=0(h
αγi)aiκ. The ciphertext is then (C1, C2, C3),
where C3 = K ·M .
Decryption((C1, C2, C3), (S, t), A, skA). Any user with a set of attributes A
satisfying |A ∩ S| ≥ t can decrypt the ciphertext by using the private key skA.
The decryption works as follows. Let AS be any subset of A ∩ S with |AS | = t,
and fS−AS (x) =
∏
at∈S−AS (x + τ(at)) be the polynomial in x and bi be the
coefficient of xi.































Finally, the user recovers the message by computing M = C3 ·K−1L/L.
2 The detail aggregation algroithm can be found in [?], which requires O(t2) exponen-
tiations.
3.2 Correctness





















































































Theorem 2. Let λ be an integer. For any adversary A against the IND-sCPA
security of our ABE scheme with advantage ε for a universal of q attributes P ,
and a challenge pair (S, t) with s = |S|, there exists an algorithm solving the
(q,m, s, t)-aMSE-DDH problem with the same advantage ε.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A against the IND-sCPA security of
our ABE scheme. We are going to construct an algorithm (simulator) B that
uses A as a black-box and solves the aMSD-DDH problem. In particular, the
simulator B is given an instance of this hard problem and his aim is to solve this
problem by using the guess of encrypted message. The interaction between A
and B works as follows.
Initialize: The simulator B specifies a universe of attributes P = {at1, at2, · · · , atq}.
Next, the adversary selectively chooses (S, t) to attack, where S is a set with s
attributes and t is a threshold number t satisfying 1 ≤ t ≤ s. Without loss of
generality, let S = {at1, at2, · · · , ats} be the challenge set.






















































0 , · · · , h
ωγm+t
0 (6)













x is a root of f(x) : at /∈ S
x is a root of g(x) : at ∈ S .




0 , h = h0, α = α0γ
m, β = β0γ


















0 : i ∈ [0,m]




The degree of γm−if(γ) in γ is q+m at most, we have all gi can be computed
from the line (1) of the instance. It is easy to find that are hi are available from
the line (4) of the instance, and u can be computed from the line (2) of the
instance because f(γ)γt−1 in u has degree q + t− 1 only.
KeyGen: For a key extraction query on the attribute set A ⊂ P. Let AS =
A ∩ S where S is the challenge attribute set. We should have |AS | ≤ t− 1. The


















which requires the simulator to compute it without knowing α and β.
The simulator first randomly chooses r′ ∈ Zp and sets the random number r
in the above private key as





where β0, γ, ω are from the instance. We have r is uniformly random due to r
′.
In terms of the simulation on the private key, we have the holding of the
following equations. Since each attribute at in A is either in the set A − AS or












which therefore is a polynomial in x with degree q + t− 1 at most.
Let f i1(x), f
i
2(x), f3(x) be polynomials defined as

































































ωγfati(γ) is a polynomial in γ with q + t degree at most.
β0fati(γ) is a polynomial in γ with q + t− 1 degree at most.
ωγf i1(γ) is a polynomial in γ with m+ t degree at most.
β0f
i
2(γ) is a polynomial in γ with m+ t− 2 degree at most.
ωγfm1 (γ) is a polynomial in γ with m+ t degree at most.
β0f3(γ) is a polynomial in γ with m+ t− 2 degree at most.
Finally, the simulator B computes g
r
γ+τ(ati) for all ati from the lines (2) and
(3) of the instance, hrγ
i
for all i ∈ [1,m−1] and h(r−β)γm from the lines (5) and
(6) of the instance.
Challenge: Once the adversary A sends two messages M0,M1 ∈ GT for chal-
lenge, the simulator B flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1} and sets the challenge


















the last element of the line (2) and T is the unknown element to be decided.






















C∗3 = e(hs−t, u)





0 ) ·Mb = T ·Mb
Therefore, CT ∗ is a valid challenge ciphertext for (S, t) on the message Mb.
Guess: The adversary returns a guess b′ of b, and the simulator returns true
if b′ = b which means T = e(g0, h0)
α0β0f(γ)γ
m+s−1
. Otherwise, the simulator
returns false.
The simulation is completed. The correctness of simulation is analyzed as
follows.
There is no abortion during the simulation for the simulator as all private
keys and the challenge ciphertext are computable from the instance of the hard
problem. It is easy to see that g, h are random group elements because of g0, h0
and α, β, γ are uniformly random and independent due to α0, β0, γ in the in-
stance. Notice that each random number r for the private key generation is
computed by (r′ωγ + β0)γ
t−1−|AS |
∏
at∈AS (γ + τ(at)) where r
′ is chosen ran-
domly and independently. Therefore, we have the simulation is indistinguishable
from the real scheme when T is true.
When T is true, we have the adversary cannot distinguish the simulation from
the real scheme and will break the scheme with advantage ε according to the
definition of security. When T is false, it is unformly random and independent
from the view of C∗1 , C
∗
2 such that it is a one-time pad and hence the adversary
has no advantage in guessing the chosen bit b. We therefore duduce
εreduction =
∣∣Pr[B guess T=True|T=True]− Pr[B guess T=True|T=False]∣∣
=







This completes the proof for theorem. 
4 Discussion
4.1 Benefits of Encryption without Dummy Attributes
Let f(γ) be the polynomial in γ whose degree is m−1. We have the computation
on hκαf(γ) from κ, hαγ
i
: i ∈ [0,m] requires m exponentiations. In particular,
let fi be the coefficient of γ







If we want to compute hκαf(γ)(γ+d), note that we cannot save the overload












which still requires linear number of exponentiations in the degree of f(γ)(γ+d).







in the scheme [10] compared to C2 = h
κ·α
∏
at∈S(γ+τ(at)) in our scheme. Based
on the above analysis, our encryption time is liner in the number of s while the
scheme in [10] is linear in the number of m, where m is the upper bound of all
choice s. The corresponding decryption is also different and ours will be much
faster. The detailed efficiency is provided in the following table.
4.2 Efficient Threshold Change
Another benefit of our encryption is the dynamic choice of threshold number t
after the selection of attribute set S. In our scheme, upon receiving the set S,
the encryptor can complete most of exponentiations. Once the threshold num-
ber t is given, only two exponentiations are required. While in [10], both S and
Schemes Herranz et al. [10] Ours
Encryption m+ t+ 1 exponentiations 1 pairing and s+ 3 exponentiations
Decryption 3 pairings and O(t2 +m) exponentiations 2 pairings and O(t2 + s) exponentiations
Table 2. Comparison of two Threshold ABE with Constant-Size Ciphertexts. s is the
number of attributes in the chosen attribute set S, t is the corresponding threshold
number and m is the upper bound of attribute number in S. We notice that the pairing
computation in the encryption can be saved if all e(hαγ
i
, u) have been precomputed in
the public parameters.
t must be provided, otherwise, the encryptor cannot perform C2 computation.
This property allows the encryptor to flexibly change the threshold during the
application. More precisely, given a ciphertext for (S, t) and the random number
κ, the encryption can quickly change it into (S, t′) for any t′ with two exponen-
tiations.
5 Conclusion
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) has proven to be a very promising crypto-
graphic primitive that offers fine-grain access control. Herranz et al. proposed
the first constant-size threshold ABE. The scheme has nice feature, namely there
is no necessity to change any of the user’s private keys due to any addition or
removal of the attributes. Additionally, the public key size is linear in the up-
perbound of the selected attribute set in the encryption phase. Unfortunately,
this work makes use of dummy attributes in their construction, which leads to
inefficiency. In this work, we proposed a novel approach to achieve a constant-
size threshold ABE without dummy attributes. We also retain the nice features
offered by the previous scheme. We make two specific improvements in compar-
ison to the previous work. First, the cost for encryption and decryption is only
linear to the size of the selected attribute set. Second, threshold number can be
decided after the selection of the attribute set in the encryption phase.
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Appendix
A Analysis of Hard Problem

































































0 , · · · , h
ωγm+t
0 ,
the aim of this problem is to decide whether
T = e(g0, h0)
κα0β0f(γ)γ
m+s−1
or T is a random element from GT .
In the following theorem, we prove that this hard problem captures the in-
dependence as required in the (P,Q, F )-GDHE problem.
Theorem 1 The aMSE-DDH assumption is a (P,Q, F )-GDHE assumption.
Proof. Let h0 = g
η
0 for some integer η. Our assumption can be reformulated as







2 · · · α0γq+m
β0 β0γ β0γ
2 · · · β0γq+t
ω ωγ ωγ2 · · · ωγq+t
ηα0 ηα0γ ηα0γ
2 · · · ηα0γ2m
ηβ0 ηβ0γ ηβ0γ
2 · · · ηβ0γm+t−2





To prove our assumption is a (P,Q, F )-GDHE assumption, we need to prove





where pi, pj are from P and q1 is from Q. By making all possible products of
two polynomials from P that contains common parameter ηκα0β0, we prove that
there is no linear combination from the below set R which can generate F .
R =
(
ηκα0β0 · g(γ)γm ηκα0β0 · g(γ)γm+1 ηκα0β0 · g(γ)γm+2 · · · ηκα0β0 · g(γ)γq+m+t
ηκα0β0 · f(γ)γs−t ηκα0β0 · f(γ)γs−t+1 ηκα0β0 · f(γ)γs−t+2 · · · ηκα0β0 · f(γ)γm+s−2
)
.
If there exists such a combination, it can be written as
ηκα0β0f(γ)γ
m+s−1 = ηκα0β0g(γ)γ
m ·A(γ) + ηκα0β0f(γ)γs−t ·B(γ),
where A(γ) is a (q+t)-degree at most polynomial in γ and B(γ) is an (m+t−2)-
degree at most polynomial in γ. Let the degree of A(x) be dA in the above
formula. We firstly simplify the formula as







The degree of B(γ) is m+s−2 at most, such that the left polynomial cannot
be equivalent to zero. Therefore, the above equation implies the two non-zero
polynomials must have the same degree. The degree of the left polynomial is
q + m + t − 1 while the degree of the right polynomial is s + m + t − s + dA.
Hence, we have dA = q − 1.
Since f(γ) and g(γ)γm+t−s are co-prime, we therefore have f(γ)|A(γ) or










no A(α), B(α) exist and then no {ai,j , b1} exist. We therefore yield the theorem.
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